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Foreword 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) was founded in 1973 to  pro- 
mote collaborative research among scholars of what was then called the East and the West. Its 
founding national member organizations were from both regions. 
With this history, it was natural for the USSR Committee on Economic Reform t o  turn in 
1989 to  IIASA for assistance on the complex problems of a transition of a centrally planned 
economy t o  a market system. IIASA organized a series of seminars in 1990 and 1991 that  
provided a dialogue between Soviet and Western economists. IIASA collaborators also compiled 
a set of reports for use of the Committee.' 
In 1992 a similar relationship was established with the government of the Russian Federation. 
IIASA agreed to  organize a series of seminars on topics of concern to  the government. The Ford 
Foundation and the Pew Charitable Trusts have generously provided financial support for the 
seminar series. 
This paper is a report of the first major seminar held at  the request of the Russian govern- 
ment. The subject of inter-republican trade is an important one for all the independent nations 
that  were once members of the Soviet Union as well as for the Russian Federation. The Soviet 
Union was built over seventy years ago as a single market with inter-republic trade integrating 
the economic activity of each republic into one economy. Trade can, of course, thrive equally 
well without a common government, but inter-republic trade has declined sharply since 1991 for 
the various reasons discussed in this report. That decline, in turn, explains in part the serious 
deterioration of economic conditions among all the republics. 
This report summarizes the seminar participants' attempt to  search out solutions that  would 
bring back inter-republic trade to levels that  would promote economic recovery and growth. The 
report demonstrates the complexity and difficulties of the problem. It shows there is no agreed 
easy solution. 
The report, however, does not perhaps convey the most promising aspect of the seminar: the 
willingness of experts from various republics and various institutions to  approach the problem 
with mutual respect and an intense desire t o  find solutions that  would serve the interests of all 
the republics. It is this quality that  the seminar participants demonstrated and, indeed, the 
seminar itself in some small measure may have promoted. 
Merton J. Peck 
Project Leader 
'The reports are summarized in Merton J .  Peck and Thomas J .  Richardson, What ie to be Done? Propoeals 
for the Soviet Traneition to the Market, Yale University Press, 1991. 
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Economic Relations Among the Successor Republics of the USSR Introduction 
Within the framework of an agreement between the government of the Russian Federation 
(RF) and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), the Economic 
Transition and Integration (ETI) Project at IIASA organized a seminar on "Economic 
Relations Among the Successor Republics of the USSR ". The seminar, held on 11-13 March 
1993 in Laxenburg, Austria, responded to a request of officials from the Russian government. 
Senior government officials, experts, and scholars from the new, independent republics as 
well as from the West met to discuss issues of inter-republican relations and consider 
acceptable and efficient solutions. 
The organization of the seminar reflects the understanding that the unresolved problems of 
trade and payments between the successor republics of the Soviet Union are a major source 
of political tensions and the decline of production in the region. Participants at the workshop 
agreed that the republics are economically interdependent to an extraordinary degree -- a 
legacy of their Soviet past which regarded the union as one market. Production of tractors 
or machine tools, for example, would be concentrated in one or two republics with key 
suppliers located in other republics. Thus, inter-republic trade is necessary for continued 
production. Since 1990 such trade has declined by as much as 50 percent. Transition to 
reliable cooperation between the independent republics and to the market economy can 
progress smoothly only as long as inter-republic trade and payments issues are settled in a 
mutually acceptable and economically efficient fashion. 
The discussion at the workshop centered both on the reasons for the decline in inter-republic 
trade and on various ways to halt this decline or even improve the tattered economic 
relations. Topics included the consequences of the abandonment of the single ruble; the rise 
and implications of barter trade; the problems created by some republics' near monopolies 
over key natural resources, such as oil from Russia and cotton from Central Asian republics; 
the difficulties in moving to world prices, especially for oil; and the plans for a new inter- 
republican bank designed to ease difficulties of payment between the states. Also examined 
were the problems created by large trade deficits in some republics, diverse trade policy 
between the new nations, new currencies, and the role of the exchange rate. Bilateral 
balanced trade under the present conditions was considered an unrealistic goal. 
The timing of the seminar so soon after January 1993 raised a paradox: as Western Europe 
seeks to become a single market, the republics of the former Soviet Union have divided 
themselves into little economies, rejected a common currency, and broken up one of the 
largest free-trade zones in the world. According to statements by senior government officials 
at the seminar, most of the republics are officially committed to re-establish free trade in the 
long run, but they currently maintain quotas and export controls that act as barriers to trade. 
Free trade with an effective payments mechanism promises to undo the damage of autarky, 
though not overnight. 
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The structure of this report largely follows that of the seminar. The sections cover issues 
concerned with trade, exchange rates, the establishment of new currencies, and the new 
interstate bank and payments schemes. Although all the sessions were taped and a complete 
set of papers contributed by the participants was collected, this report is presented in a more 
concise manner. It is a summary of the key issues and a description of alternatives for the 
policy-makers. The expository form of presentation has been chosen in order to present a 
more succinct and cohesive account of the discussions at the meeting as well as the 
information provided there. The accounts of the various national experts and officials as well 
as the ensuing discussions during this seminar have been complemented with background 
material (these are listed in the references). 
The authors of this report and organizers of the seminar, all members of the ETI Project, 
wish to thank all the participants in the seminar for their contributions. A list of seminar 
participants is given in the Appendix. 
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Trade Relations Amone FSU Republics 
Policy Options 
The political disintegration of the former Soviet Union (FSU) ensued the deterioration of the 
single economic space that once existed on its territory. This deterioration only worsened the 
general crisis of the FSU economies. Although structural changes, needed to cure former 
communist economies, require a deep restructuring of inter-republican trade relations, the 
spontaneous collapse of the trade relations is regarded as being the worst solution for that. 
There is wide agreement among republics of FSU that a substantial part of the inter- 
republican trade must be preserved. 
There is. however, broad agreement that the structure of trade inherited from the FSU must 
be radically changed. In the FSU, numerous industries were -- and still are to a large 
extent -- negative value-adding, based on the world market prices and costs. These industries 
use raw materials received at prices well below world prices from countries rich of raw 
materials (primarily, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan), and supply these countries in 
return with manufactured goods. The move to trade among republics based on the world 
prices will result in collapse of such activities because the price of the manufactured goods 
will increase to such a level that these goods will not stand the more intense competition from 
more efficient foreign industries. Therefore, some decline of inter-republican trade must be 
considered as necessary long-term adjustment. 
Poor statistics in the FSU do not allow to assess the degree of decline necessary for such a 
long-term adjustment. However, since the full-scale restructuring of the FSU industries has 
barely begun, the current sharp decline in trade must be attributed to a large extent to the 
technical and institutional barriers. These barriers must be removed in order for the viable 
and mutually beneficial trade among the republics to survive pending restructuring. 
The current situation cannot be characterized as favoring inter-republican trade relations. The 
existing trade arrangements between the republics of the FSU are inconsistent with the trade 
policies suggested by conventional wisdom: 
- avoid quantitative restrictions on trade; 
- avoid non-tariff barriers to trade. 
The newly independent countries (even the most advanced in economic transformation, the 
Baltic states) continue to build up new barriers impeding trade relations, mostly in the form 
of multiple export restrictions.' All 15 states were making the widespread use of quantitative 
restraints on exports in 1992, both for FSU and convertible currency area trade. These trade 
' It is important to note that trade restrictions occur even at the regional (oblast) level in the Russian 
Federation. 
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restrictions have deep roots in obsolete price structures, monopolistic and demand- 
unresponsive industries, severe bureaucratization of trade regulation, deterioration of inter- 
republican payment systems and the lack of an adequate means for payment transactions. 
There are several preconditions that must be fulfilled for the republics to stop relying on 
export restrictions. These are: 
- liberalization of the internal prices; 
- imposition of a hard budget constraint on enterprises; 
- creation of an adequate inter-republican payment system. 
Until these three requirements are fulfilled, traditional recipes of trade regulation are hardly 
helpful for the republics of FSU. Therefore, any policy-related suggestions must be based on 
the second-best solutions. There are several general recommendations among these second- 
best solutions. 
The general policy recommendation to the raw-material importing republics would be not to 
resist Russia's attempts to impose the world prices on oil and gas sold to these republics. To 
some extent, the severe trade shock inflicted by Russia gives these republics unique 
opportunities for rapid and politically feasible restructuring of domestic industries. If, instead, 
the republics choose the way of gradual restructuring and endless quarrels with Russia and 
other oil-and-gas producers, this might create political instability within the republics and 
worsen relations with Russia for years and even decades ahead. In this sense, the trade shock 
imposed by Russia to newly independent countries creates a political situation more favorable 
for the reforms, than Russia itself might have within the country. 
There is, however, a bright spot even for Russia and other raw-material producers in the 
move to the world prices in inter-republican trade. It is related to the subsequent adjustment 
in the prices of manufactured goods that Russia received from other republics within FSU. 
With world-market priced inputs, manufactured goods produced by inefficient republican 
enterprises become unacceptably expensive for Russian consumers and/or enterprises. This 
has three immediate consequences: 1) moderating domestic inflation as less expensive 
manufactured products are imported from republics, 2) a desirable restructuring of the 
negative value-adding industries, and 3) re-orientation of Russian consumption to third 
countries' suppliers which are now competitive in the Russian market as world prices prevail. 
There are strong reasons for Russia to carry out such a re-orientation. Therefore, it would 
be advisable for Russia to boldly shift to world market prices in trade with other republics 
even if the domestic structural adjustment would be painful for Russia. 
Another general suggestion is that Russia (as well as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) should 
provide other republics with trade credits instead of selling raw materials at subsidized prices. 
This will substantially help to de-politicize trade relations among the republics. This approach 
will help to gradually reduce all trade preferences over time to permit different republics to 
adjust to their long-run comparative advantages. That adjustment implies less dependence on 
inter-republican trade and a stronger orientation to the world market. 
Several initiatives should be undertaken on the micro level. It is widely argued that 
quantitative restrictions on various exports, particularly raw materials, protect domestic 
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producers who otherwise could not buy domestic inputs. Such protection may be particularly 
valuable to negative value added industries and in this way add to the cost of transition. 
Export restrictions are much worse than direct selective subsidies to potentially viable 
industries. 
In contrast to quantitative restrictions, export taxes are revenue-earning for the federal budget. 
Moreover, they are economic rather than administrative instruments of control over trade. 
These advantages, however, exist only in theory. A very long tradition of rent-seeking in the 
FSU poses the threat that even these instruments will be used in a detrimental administrative 
way. Nevertheless, export taxes are ranking ahead of direct subsidies in terms of reducing 
the adverse effects. All efforts should be made to enforce export taxes regulation, along with 
gradual abolishment of quantitative restrictions. 
The republics should make all efforts to set up a customs union. Since this solution is 
politically difficult to achieve, bilateral free-trade agreements are reasonable second-best 
solution. Given multiple export restrictions, present free-trade agreements can hardly be 
called such. Yet even in their limited form they serve as an important manifestation of the 
long-term move in the right direction. Given the present excessive incentive to import from 
within the ruble zone, preferential trade arrangements would be most important for promoting 
trade among states with different currencies. 
Finally, inter-government barter seems to be an important substitute to yet inadequate private 
trade structures, and the only viable mechanism given virtual collapse of the payment system. 
However, efforts should be made where possible to commercialize inter-state trade 
arrangements, namely, eliminate monopoly position of state trading organizations, convert 
them into procurement agencies for the import of commodities for use by government, and 
subject them to competition from private companies. 
Progress in trade relations, however, depends on the establishment of an efficient payment 
system whereby a firm in one FSU republic can be paid promptly for its sales to firms in 
another FSU republic. The state of the current payment system and the issues concerning 
possible alternatives or modifications are discussed in the following section. 
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Payment Schemes and the Interstate Bank 
Payments Arrangements and Trade Patterns 
Most participants at the IIASA seminar supported the creation of a functioning payments or 
settlements system among the republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Political and 
economic reform in the individual republics has led to a drastic deterioration of trade volume 
among formerly mutually dependent partners. The lack of an effective payments mechanism 
is a major cause of the decline in inter-republican trade. A payment mechanism is a 
necessary condition for improved trade relations amongst the various new politically 
independent nations. 
The republics of the former Soviet Union are by no means unilaterally dependent on Russia, 
but there is a mutual dependency -- for Russia is also dependent on the other former republics 
(i.e., for transit to important sea ports (in the Baltic Sea), for finished goods, etc.). In fact, 
the industrial structures created and promoted during the better part of 70 years of 
communist central planning was based on the concept of a single union-wide market based 
on trade between individual republics. Each republic to a varying extent depended and still 
depends on others for inputs for its industry as well as final goods. It also depends on others 
for a market for its products. 
Since the autumn of 1991, inter-republican trade within the FSU declined drastically for 
numerous reasons. One of the most decisive is the non-functional payments scheme with the 
lack of a convertible base currency, and the general inability of the existing currencies of the 
new independent nations to hold their relative value. Given the structural differences between 
the various republics and the financial instability within the region, an inherent tendency for 
trade imbalances has arisen. In addition, rapid inflation has become a prime incentive to 
delay payments for traded goods and, with increasing frequency, these postponements have 
finally resulted in non-payments. 
The obstacles to viable settlements arrangements persist, further stalling efforts to resolve 
payment conflicts and to facilitate inter-republican trade. These obstacles include the 
continuation of barter trade and state orders. Today, the latter are referred to as obligatory 
trade, but only the words have changed while the meaning has stayed the same. In addition, 
market-oriented practices frequently meet with the opposition of the more conventional 
enterprise managers, policies aimed at maintaining old production patterns and structures 
chronically recur, and inter-enterprise debts have become a serious phenomenon. 
Furthermore, there is insufficient information concerning the characteristics of the various 
markets and an inadequate number of personnel with knowledge regarding the reform and 
expansion of banking and payments systems as well as those required to physically perform 
the required tasks. 
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The dissolution of the former Soviet state and the desire to prevent trade and payments 
imbalances from getting out of hand resulted in a tendency among governments to favor 
bilateral trade and settlements agreements. Correspondent accounts and technical credits are 
a product of this preference. However, in 1993 there has been a shift in views that favor 
market oriented, multilateral proposals for trade and payments agreements as more effective 
in promoting inter-republic trade. 
Proposed Alternate Payments Systems for Inter-Republic Trade 
Beginning in 1992, the payments and settlements regime in use for inter-republican 
transactions amongst the successors to the USSR was based on bilateral correspondent 
accounts held by each of the republican central banks with the Central Bank of Russia (Ickes, 
1993, p. 13). This has been called the "Ruble zone" concept. Initially, non-Russian 
republics could use this system to obtain endless credit for bilateral trade transactions from 
the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) because no effective mechanism was introduced to control 
overdrawn balances on the correspondent accounts. In order to introduce more strict financial 
discipline, to eliminate inter-enterprise arrears, and to reflect increased autonomy in monetary 
policy of the non-Russian republics, the CBR subsequently modified this payments system 
several times during 1992 to create more control by the CBR over correspondent accounts. 
However, the changes gave rise to more problems impeding the reliability and functioning 
of the payments regime, such as the so-called technical credits extended by the CBR to the 
republican central banks. In fact, as the clearing system was portrayed in early 1993, it 
actually presupposed the existence of the technical credits, which were themselves not 
restricted by any precisely controlled limits. The constant changes also fuelled inflation in 
the individual republics, increased transactions costs, and further worsened the enterprise 
arrears situation, especially regarding the payments from non-Russian enterprises. Inevitably, 
the malaise surrounding the settlements system induced enterprises to search and find methods 
to avoid inter-republican trade because it had become too costly. 
The financial strictness intended by limiting the credit line of the CBR in the correspondent 
accounts was offset by the relatively generous provision of technical credits by the CBR. 
Inter-bank debt (that is between central banks of all the republics) continue to accumulate. 
The entire process only aided and abetted in discrediting the value of the ruble and its role 
as a unit of account. 
By the spring of 1993, officials from the central banks of the FSU republics turned their 
attention towards alternative settlements systems with multilateral rather than bilateral clearing 
procedures. The payments regime chosen can play a major role in allocating inter-republican 
transfers and in enforcing the internalization of the consequences of cash and non-cash ruble 
emissions (ibid, p. 15). The credibility of the payments regime will be a function of the 
general level of financial stability; the latter, in itself, depending on prudent monetary policy 
and a frugal fiscal policy. 
ETI Project, IIASA 
Economic Relations Among the Successor Republics of the USSR Payment Schemes and the Interstate Bank 
Successive modifications of a decentralized payments system to accommodate the structural 
economic changes commensurate of a transition to a market economy, particularly in the 
presence of a functioning and complementary centralized payments system, combined with 
financial policies aimed at stabilizing national currencies, should provide for a positive trade 
response and give a boost to output. Furthermore, the success of the economic 
transformation of the republics will depend, in part, on the ability of a payments regime to 
allow maximum flexibility of exchange rates to reflect the relative prices of goods. 
Possible alternative payments systems suggested by experts include a ruble zone, a ruble area, 
dollar settlement, a clearing or payments union, floating exchange rates, and barter 
(Williamson, 1993, p. 1). At this writing, the ruble zone, which requires the continued use 
of the ruble as the currency in the FSU republics, faces rapid disintegration. The collapse 
is mainly due to the political unacceptability on the part of the non-Russian republics of a 
centrally controlled macroeconomic policy. In addition, continuing the ruble zone buffers 
some of the FSU republics' economies from fiscal and monetary responsibilities with which 
they would be otherwise confronted. 
As a result, the idea of the ruble area has been proposed. This would require non-Russian 
republics that had introduced their own individual currency to be willing nevertheless to hold 
balances of rubles in correspondent accounts in Moscow and exchange those claims in order 
to clear inter-republican trade (ibid, p. 2). This potential solution is more conceivable since 
the FSU republics leaders agreed to the creation of the Interstate Bank. However, with the 
ruble's difficulty in holding its value, it may be wise to select an alternative currency for 
settlements remembering though that the republics holdings of any hard currencies are very 
limited. The possibility of transactions being settled with dollar balances as required under 
the dollar settlement concept seems uncertain -- maybe even improbable. 
Recently, calls to establish a multilateral payments union (MPU) for the former USSR 
republics have gained increased support from experts. Sub-optimally low transactions on a 
given monetary base and the high cost of acquiring hard currencies to support transactions 
have reinforced the belief that a payments union along the lines of the European Payments 
Union (EPU) of the 1950s could pose a possible solution. The idea behind this suggestion 
is for the member countries to denominate their intra-trade in a hard currency, agree to accept 
one another's currencies in payment for exports, deposit their earnings from those exports 
with an agent of .the union, allow the claims to be consolidated and periodically netted out on 
a multilateral basis, and then settle the remaining imbalances centrally with the union in a 
mixture of credit and hard currencies (ibid, p. 3). The main function of a MPU would be 
a multilateral clearing of inter-republican trade which reduces the amount of trade flows that 
require a payment in hard currency to settle trade imbalances within the union as well as to 
provide the precautionary demand for those reserves (Bofinger and Gros, 1993, p. i). An 
MPU would economize on the use of hard currencies needed to support union trade, 
encouraging both inter-republican trade and exchanges with non-FSU nations. 
Within the group of FSU republics, Russia inherently will be the dominating force. 
Therefore, the feasibility of such a settlements arrangement will largely depend on the ability 
of the Russian government to pursue non-inflationary monetary and fiscal policies; that is, 
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generally a stable macroeconomic policy. Finally, the MPU appears as a favored 
intermediate solution in the attempt to slowly give the market more credit for encouraging 
settlements between enterprises, and eventually reducing the role and activities of the 
governments. In order to realize such developments, an initial step would be to allow 
correspondent accounts at commercial banks that could also be used to settle inter-republic 
payments. 
A third alternative is the use of floating exchange rates for the republics' individual 
currencies. This approach would permit the payments for inter-republican trade to be settled 
through the commercial banking system based on the resulting cross rates. However, 
financial stability and strict macroeconomic policies would again be a prerequisite for success 
of this option. The central banking system must also be functional, dependable, and credible. 
Barter trade, the last option, is notoriously inefficient and not conducive to the development 
of a market economy. Numerous East European experts, however, have stated that at times 
the choice for enterprises or republics on the territory of the FSU is between barter trade or 
no trade at all. 
The Interstate Bank: A Potential Solution 
In an effort to prevent the complete disintegration of inter-republican trade among the 
successor nations of the FSU, the heads of state of 10 FSU republics signed an agreement to 
establish the Interstate Bank (ISB) on 22 January 1993'. The agreement recognized the 
importance of coordinated banking activities and with a view to maintain and develop 
multilateral industrial, trade, and financial relations and to successively achieve monetary 
stability. The signing parties agreed that the ISB should have the responsibility to organize 
and effect multilateral settlements between central (national) banks relating to trade and other 
operations (EES, 1993, p. 7). Furthermore, the ISB is to be a forum through which republics 
can coordinate credit and monetary policies. The present agreement also designates the ruble 
as the currency in which the settlements through the Bank are to be carried out. Article 3 
of the agreement to establish the ISB clearly sets out six main tasks: 
1. organization and realization of multilateral inter-state settlements and periodical 
multilateral clearing (netting of mutual claims), 
2. the organization of the management of cash money emission and credit emission 
by the central (national) banks of the signing parties, 
3. monitoring of the economies of the signing parties and the completion of 
recommendations concerning the coordination of monetary, credit, and exchange 
policies, 
4. assistance in organizing the more technical aspects of payments systems for the 
individual members, 
The Baltic states, Georgia, and Azerbaijan did not sign the agreement. 
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5 .  the extension of credit as required by the multilateral inter-state settlements, and 
6 .  other special operations as designated by the charter. 
The clearing system described in the agreement resembles a combination between the ideas 
behind the second and fourth proposal described above, a cross between the ruble area 
concept and the payments union notion. 
The mutual decision of FSU republics to commit themselves to the creation and operation of 
the ISB was an essential step towards normalizing trade relations on the territory of the 
former USSR. The agreement and the charter finally provide a multilaterally acceptable 
institutional framework for a disciplined payments system to cover inter-republican trade. 
The ISB should, in effect, eliminate the incentives for bilateralism, corruption, and 
profiteering. Some say the creation of this bank signals the turning point towards a 
multilateral system that eventually leads to the full convertibility of the national currencies 
that are being created (Gros, 1993, p. i). 
A number of experts believe that the view that ISB operations will curtail the incentive 
system, motivating states to amass credits and be delinquent with payments, is unfounded. 
The capital of the ISB is not to be utilized for the extension of credits and the CBR will only 
do so as clearly stated under the conditions specified in the charter of the ISB. Whether the 
credit limit is appropriate, unreasonably strict or lax, is difficult to say at present. An issue 
that should be of greater concern is what might arise when the initial credit lines granted by 
the CBR to the ISB are exhausted. Then debtor countries will have to acquire Russian rubles 
(possibly even by selling hard currency reserves) if they want to continue to import from 
Russia. Russia might push for the indexing of cumulative balances to hard currencies, 
leading to partial hard currency settlements. In light of persistent imbalances, the payments 
union would eventually lead to full hard currency settlement and would thus be equivalent to 
full convertibility (ibid, p. 19). 
One of the guiding themes in creating the ISB was the effort to minimize the disruptions to 
trade as a result of the establishment and operation of ISB. This goal was to be achieved by 
utilizing as much as possible established channels and practices familiar to traders and 
enterprises as long as these were not vulnerable or conducive to corruption. Also, with this 
new scheme, national central banks simply send their payment orders to the ISB rather than 
undertake all the bilateral back and forth as was previously the case. 
A further advantage of the Interstate Bank is that countries outside the ruble area can 
participate in the multilateral clearing (i.e., the Baltic nations, or some members of the 
former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). These countries would not be founding 
members of the Bank. In order to participate all they would need to do is open a 
correspondent account with the ISB, and all that means is that they would have only a single 
correspondent account instead of possibly ten or more for each FSU nation. These countries 
would have only one balance vis-a-vis the FSU republics rather than numerous ones to 
manage, providing efficiency gains. The more countries participate, the more important will 
be the multilateral clearing aspect. 
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However, several questions still face the operation of the ISB. Due to the interpretation of 
potentially allowing the ISB, upon receipt of special permission from a republic, to manage 
the monetary emission of such a republic causes queries to arise as to the precise division 
of responsibilities between the ISB and the CBR or whether the ISB might even replace the 
CBR. The clarification of this issue was still outstanding at the end of the seminar. In 
addition, this policy might imply that countries that are members of the ISB but not of the 
ruble area have a say in the policy for the area. This would certainly be the root of future 
instability. 
Uneasiness also exists with respect to the possibility that the ISB might be seen as a 
discouragement for the activity of commercial banks. The existence of the ISB might appear 
to reveal a preference for government exchange. This is neither appropriate nor desirable at 
a time when the trend is toward the market forces and privatization. This concern might be 
discounted as the Bank simply offers a multilateral clearing mechanism which is potentially 
additional to that of the private sector; it should be seen as a complement and not a substitute 
in the development of a commercial multilateral payments system. However, the Interstate 
Bank has been initially conceptualized as a technical body assigned the responsibility of all 
payments made through the central national banks between the members. Such payment is 
merely a small segment of total inter-state payments. Furthermore, if the private sector is 
more successful, then the impact of the ISB will be more minor -- in any case, no conflict 
should arise. The ISB will do no less than assist in making the new national currencies more 
convertible. 
A further concern about the ISB is the choice of the ruble as the base currency for such a 
payments system due to its falling credibility and fluctuating value. The significance of this 
concern depends on whether the CBR will exert sufficient monetary control, or yield to the 
temptation (as has been the case in the bilateral payments systems) that when countries reach 
their limits, a further extension of credit occurs, subverting the discipline which is supposed 
to be imposed by such a system. 
Another problematic issue is the influence of negative real interest rates. In a monetary 
system with an extremely negative real rate of interest, as is currently the case in Russia, no 
one will be willing to promptly pay or to extend credit. Nevertheless, the situation is 
different in the FSU because the assumption is that the non-Russian republics will be net 
debtors, thus, this aspect might in fact be a positive attraction in favor of having the ruble as 
the base currency of the ISB. Russia, though, would probably soon encounter a circumstance 
in which it recognizes that it has given the wrong incentives for other republics. These 
would be confronted with the motivation of FSU republics to borrow right up to their credit 
limits. Russia would subsequently disapprove of the system because all the members would 
use their debt to the Bank to draw goods out of Russia in the inexpensive fashion made 
possible by a negative real rate of interest. Non-Russian members would have no interest in 
holding a current account surplus in a currency losing its value in real terms. A possible 
answer lies in indexing the balances to some selected Russian prices. Of course, an even 
better solution is a macro-economic policy that will bring Russian inflation to moderate 
levels. 
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The payment systems discussed at the seminar all assume the ruble remains the key currency. 
Given Russia's size and economic importance, that is a realistic assumption. Yet, the reliance 
on the ruble would be reduced by the efforts of FSU republics to establish their own 
currencies, a topic considered in the next section. 
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Establishment of New Currencies 
Establishing a new national currency is always at least a two-dimensional issue. In its political 
dimension, one can consider the introduction of an independent currency in terms of 
strengthening national sovereignty and fostering national pride. These aspects are 
characteristic phenomena accompanying the collapse of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and 
the re-birth of ethnic, national, and regional feelings. In spite of the undeniable importance 
of these factors in understanding current developments on FSU territory, we concentrate only 
on the main economic issues and consequences of the efforts to introduce independent legal 
tenders in successor states of the FSU. 
General Remarks 
In deciding on introducing a new currency, every government should appraise all economic 
costs and benefits. The items on both sides are numerous. As far as costs are concerned, 
direct (explicit) costs include: printing and distributing the new currency; setting up the 
institutions and policy mechanisms; acquiring the abilities needed to operate monetary policy 
and central bank operations in general; and conducting international transactions. Even more 
significant and probably more difficult to predict will be the indirect (implicit) costs. These 
typically refer to the output (income) and employment losses caused by the shift to world 
market pricing in inter-republican trade3, disruptions of former trade flows, changes in the 
terms of trade, malfunctioning of trade and payments systems. 
The most important benefit is independent shaping of monetary policy which no longer needs 
to pay much attention to the policy implemented in the ruble area. Generally, this allows 
different timing and sequencing of the major reform steps in a way which is perceived by a 
given country as the most desirable. The advantage of controlling the supply of money and 
credits consists of achieving a different (presumably lower) level of inflation than in Russia 
or in other parts of the ruble zone. The possibility of collecting seigniorage rents as additional 
revenue for financing fiscal expenditures may be important as well. 
Any effort of a country to achieve economic sovereignty, should, however, consider the 
heritage of the past, which is inescapable in the short- and medium-run. Given the historically 
conditioned dependence of smaller republics on Russia and continuing asymmetry in mutual 
economic relations (Russia is nearly the exclusive oil exporter; industrial profiles of all 
republics are highly specialized and integrated with the Russian economy), no former republic 
will be able to fully separate itself from economic developments in the ruble area in the 
foreseeable future. Independent monetary and exchange rate policies have only limited 
3 The Russian government has adopted the policy of setting energy and raw material prices at the world market 
level for FSU republics leaving the ruble zone. 
13 ETZ Project, IIASA 
Economic Relations Among the Successor Republics of the USSR Establishment of New Currencies 
influence on the process of adjustment to economic disturbances originating in Russia or 
elsewhere. 
However justified may be an effort of any successor republic to introduce its own currency, 
the questions of timing and preparation are still contentious issues. This step should be only 
undertaken after all necessary conditions are sufficiently fulfilled. The failure to create the 
conditions required to run an effective anti-inflationary policy after the introduction of 
independent currencies would very probably lead to political opposition and consequently to 
the real danger of losing the social support for economic reform itself. 
Technical Aspects of Introducing a New Currency 
The introduction of a new currency is associated with numerous technical steps.4 
Preparatory steps would include the abolition of fiscal deficits which would force the central 
bank to finance them via monetary expansion, subsequently having potentially inflationary 
impacts. Legislative acts must: 
a) introduce the new currency as a legal tender, 
b) specify the conditions for conversion, 
c) set up the monetary institution that is responsible for introduction of the currency and 
controlling the rate of monetary expansion, and 
d) regulate exchange operations. 
Establishment of a central bank has to be accompanied by clarifying: 
a) the instruments required to control money and credit, 
b) the power for imposing reserve requirements on commercial banks, 
c) the reporting systems and analytical capacity required to monitor macroeconomic 
developments. 
Announcement of the replacement of the old currency should follow certain guidelines. While 
the general idea is sufficient for the public to know during preparatory stages, all possible 
details of the conversion should be available at the right time. 
Timing and logistics refer to a certain period of time (several days), during which existing 
rubles could be exchanged for the new currency and to the mechanics of conversion. This 
includes placing an order for new bank notes, their transportation, storage and physical 
distribution to the public. 
Terms of conversion refer to the specification of the initial rate of exchange between the new 
currency and the ruble, and to quotas for conversion. 
See Hernandez-Cata (1992). 
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Arguments for Independent Currencies Versus Remaining in a Common Currency Area5 
Two groups of arguments against participation in a common currency area could be 
identified: 1) the "traditional" optimal currency area literature, considering a flexible 
exchange rate as a means for output stabilization, and 2) the "public finance" approach which 
focuses on cross-country competition for the gains from monetary coordination. 
Optimal currency area arguments 
The advantages and disadvantages of staying in a common currency area are typically 
identified with the role of exchange rate flexibility as a device for economic stabilization. 
Under the condition of downward rigidity of nominal wages an independent currency 
accompanied by flexible exchange rate is viewed as an important tool of output stabilization. 
A relevant question arises here: to what extent are certain republics potential winners? Due 
to the diversity of different republics and regions (more industrialized parts -- Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Russia versus more agricultural Central Asian countries) and ensuing diversity 
in responding to economic shocks, the pressure to introduce individual currencies could, in 
some countries, be rather strong. This may be magnified by limited inter-regional labor flows 
which restrict the capacity to stabilize output shocks in all member nations of the FSU 
including Russia. On the other hand, several factors diminish the importance of independent 
currencies as instruments for stabilization: 
- because of different inflation rates in different republics following price liberalization in 
early 1992, the adjustment of real wages across republics could occur even without 
movements of labor: 
- still resilient monopolistic structures seriously undermine the responsiveness of the 
economies to exchange rate adjustments; exchange rate changes are likely to generate price 
shifts instead of output adjustment; 
- limitation to the efficiency of the exchange rate stems from the existing payments system. 
Uncertain and prolonged receipts of payments for goods deter enterprises from using the 
existing trade and payment arrangements. Thus, the behavior of exporters does not reflect the 
fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate. 
Despite a transitory character of these phenomena, the limitations of the exchange rate as an 
effective stabilization instrument could prove to be relevant in the short-run. 
See Goldberg, Ickes, and Ryterman (1993). 
ETI Project, IIASA 
Economic Relations Among the Successor Republics of the USSR Establishment of New Currencies 
Public-finance based arguments 
Another set of arguments for maintaining independent currencies considers whether a national 
money can provide a government with a tool to increase much needed budget revenues. There 
are several fiscally related issues: 
- one is concerned with the seignorage and distribution of seignorage rents. The incentives 
of some FSU republics to introduce their own currency and use the inflation tax as a source 
of revenues could be fairly tempting. On the other hand, if such a country has succeeded in 
securing a disproportionately large share of seignorage rents, its decision to stay within the 
currency union is quite understandable. In addition, the issue of finding a key for appropriate 
territorial allocation of cash rubles arises. Even now, after the split of former Gosbank, the 
nature of cash distribution (which is still fully under control of the Central Bank of Russia) 
remains the same as before. Each country demands cash rubles to pay wages. It follows that 
the distribution of seignorage could take into account the level of economic activity reflected 
in total wage  payment^.^ 
- An important incentive for introducing an independent currency could be the different 
optimal inflation rates among countries. We can reasonably expect that the higher the reliance 
on inflation tax revenues, the lower the willingness of a high inflation country to join any 
currency union. 
- The decision to introduce a new currency may be related to a lack of interest in higher 
monetary discipline which could be attributed to a monetary union. 
The importance of these arguments is enhanced by transfers other than the seignorage 
associated with participation in the ruble zone. Two kinds of such transfers have existed: 
indirect (implicit) transfers via the distorted system of prices in inter-republican trade, and 
direct (explicit) transfers intermediated by monetary and payments regimes. 
Implicit inter-republican transfers 
Until recently inter- and extra-republican trade was based on distorted internal prices which 
did not correspond to international relative prices and which provided implicit subsidies to 
different countries. The "takeover" of world market prices of hard currency transactions in 
inter-republican trade will cause a substantial transformation of inter-republican subsidies and 
implicit transfers supported by existing relative prices. World prices had already been 
imposed on every country that decided to exit the ruble zone. 
According to some estimates, countries expecting to benefit from terms of trade changes as 
a result of moving to world prices in inter-republican transactions are Russia, Kazakhstan and 
This at first sight simple criterion must be, however, adjusted with respect to the speed and course of reforms 
in different republics. Cash ruble needs are closely connected with nominal incomes and through this with inflation 
which was a result of price liberalization as a key reform measure. It is straightforward that countries which 
liberalized prices earlier will have higher demand for cash rubles than those starting later. 
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Turkmenistan. On the other hand, Moldova, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Belarus and Armenia, 
as net recipients of subsidies, could no longer rely on this source of income and will 
experience further economic contraction at least in the short run. 
Exulicit inter-reuublican transfers 
During the course of 1992, several reforms were introduced in inter-republican payment 
regimes. They included the establishment of "correspondent accounts" (held by each 
republican central bank with the Central Bank of Russia) at the beginning of 1992; partial 
reform of this system and its tightening in February; introduction of bilateral inter-state 
payments in July; and partial reversals to some former arrangements at the end of August. 
At the beginning, these changes caused a certain tightening of payments which restricted the 
ability of individual countries to export inflation and to collect seignorage within the ruble 
zone. Then, trade disturbances and payment problems led to a deterioration of the economic 
situation in each republic. Later on some ease of payments policies materialized, 
strengthening the incentives to follow inflationary policies. 
Introduction of Independent Currencies in 1992 and 1993 
At the beginning of 1993, the countries that had exited the ruble zone accounted in total for 
more than 60 percent of the net material product of the non-Russian republics of the FSU. 
There are many signs that the ruble zone entered its last stage in the spring of 1993. 
Estonia was the first of the former Soviet republics to issue its own currency, the kroon, in 
June 1992. It is pegged to the Deutsch Mark (eight kroons for one mark). Estonian officials 
consider the currency reform as the most successful measure of economic policy in the 
country since gaining independence in 1991. Estonia exchanged all the rubles in circulation 
for its crowns in three days, at a rate of ten rubles per crown. Since then, the crown has a 
rather steady exchange ratio against convertible currencies. It even appreciated slightly against 
the Finish mark and the Swedish crown and understandably against the ruble - by a factor of 
7. 
Latvia launched the Latvian ruble, the rublis, into circulation already in May of 199Z7 but 
only later did the government declare it as the sole official currency. With a floating rate 
regime in existence, the Latvian Central Bank had policy in place to achieve the appreciation 
of the rublis. As a result of many interventions, the exchange rate moved from 170 rublis per 
US dollar in November 1992 to 130 in June this year. This March the currency that is 
considered the eventual national currency, the lat, was introduced and was exchanged against 
the rublis at the ratio 1:200. There is an intention to let both currencies circulate 
simultaneously as the rublis will be gradually withdrawn. It is interesting to note the 
impressive decrease of inflation in Latvia. While the monthly rate was about 60% at the 
beginning of 1992, it dropped to 2.6% in December and to 0.3 % by April of this year. 
This step was done in order to overcome the shortage of Russian rubles at that time. 
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Shortly after Estonia, Lithuania also introduced its own currency: the talons were allowed to 
float. During the last year, their value decreased from 200 to 500 per US dollar. The 
substitution of this temporary currency has been started on 25 June this year. The new 
currency, lit (litas), will be exchanged at the ratio 1:100 against the talon, keeping the 
exchange rate stable against the dollar (the same ratio will be applied with respect to deposits 
of population and bank accounts). Planned completion of the replacement of talons will be 
20 July 1993 when the lit becomes the only legal tender.8 
Ukraine and Belarus departed from the ruble zone in November 1992 issuing non-convertible, 
temporary currencies (coupon and karbovanets in Ukraine and zajeik in Belarus) which are 
supposed to be soon replaced by permanent ones (hryvna in Ukraine). In January 1992, the 
coupon was introduced in Ukraine to protect the people from price jumps in Russia. At first, 
coupons were only ruble substitutes, officially trading at par to the ruble and even better 
unofficially. In summer, all cash receipts of the population (wages, pensions, and withdrawals 
from bank accounts) were paid in coupons. Since the introduction of the coupon, the 
government has assured the nation that coupon is "not a money" but only a transient 
substitute. The hryvna (as a genuine Ukrainian currency) was announced and promised, but 
its effective introduction has been postponed into 1993 until the inflation and the budget 
deficits are brought under control. On 12 November, when Ukraine officially left the ruble 
zone, the karbovanets (which means ruble in Ukrainian language), was launched as a legal 
tender. 
In Georgia temporary coupons circulate. Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have printed new 
currencies (called manat in both cases), but no decision on their introduction has been made 
yet. Kyrgystan's currency, the som, was introduced on 17th May this year as one of many 
contributions to an array of new currencies. 
Kazakhstan remains the only big non-Russian republic staying firmly in the ruble zone. Some 
smaller FSU republics such as Uzbekistan also remain in the ruble zone. 
The introduction of new currencies requires, of course, an exchange rate regime for that 
currency. The seminar participants discussed the various exchange rate regimes for new 
currencies as well as the regimes for the non-cash rubles which became more and more 
independent currencies of the various FSU republics in 1993. 
Supplementary measures will be, for example, a prohibition of using foreign currencies; obligation to declare 
any exchange or deposit of all incomes in foreign currencies; and so forth. 
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Exchange Rate Re@mes and 
Inter-Republican Economic Relations 
Exchange rates are bound to play an increasing role in each formerly centrally planned 
economy going through transition to a market economy. The abolishment of earlier reliance 
on quantitative restrictions in trade and the simultaneous move towards trade liberalization 
is one of the reasons. The need to use exchange rates in the course of macroeconomic 
stabilization, as well as in the adjustment to trade shocks are additional motivations. Inter- 
republican economic relations of the former Soviet Union, however, add further dimensions 
to the use of exchange rate regimes in transition economies. 
The Emergence of Non-cash Ruble Exchange Rates 
Since the setting up of 15 republican central banks in 1991, each republic acquired the 
opportunity to create non-cash rubles (or in other words: deposit rubles) by extending non- 
cash ruble credits to their enterprises. As opposed to non-cash rubles, cash rubles are still 
printed and allocated by the Russian authorities only and can be used in a wider range of 
transactions throughout the successor republics of the former Soviet Union. Since the use of 
non-cash rubles is constrained (for instance, the extent of republican non-cash rubles used in 
inter-republican trade depends on bilateral inter-republican agreements and technical credits), 
distinctive exchange rates emerged for republican non-cash rubles in each republic, whether 
still part of the ruble area or not. This means that non-cash rubles began to be recognized as 
de facto different currencies. 
These various currencies began to be traded at exchange rates that substantially differed from 
par. For example, in January 1993 the non-cash ruble issued in Kazakhstan was traded in 
Latvia with a 41 percent discount to the cash ruble, the non-cash ruble of Uzbekistan with 
38 percent, while -- at the other extreme -- the Moldovan non-cash ruble with a mere 3 
percent discount in the same market. While these markets are thin, and the currency rates are 
not of primary concern for republican authorities, the existence of non-cash ruble exchange 
rates gives an indication of the spontaneous fragmentation of the ruble area and also of the 
diversity of speed of the disintegration across republics. 
Exchange Rate Regimes Chosen for Countries with New Currencies 
In 1992, several attempts were made in a number of republics to introduce new currencies. 
Some of these were simply coupons (to be used in certain transactions, and allocated to 
residents only) or parallel currencies (complementing the use of the ruble in certain 
transactions), while others were considered as real new currencies in the given republics. In 
the latter case one of the most important decisions with far-reaching economic and political 
consequences has been the choice of the exchange rate regime to be applied for the new 
currency. 
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Some participants of the IIASA seminar discussed this issue in relation to the dichotomy of 
fixed versus freely floating exchange rates, while others argued that real world exchange rates 
are no longer so clearly distinguishable and exchange rates cannot be separated from 
complementary macro-economic policies. For instance, with the choice of a fixed exchange 
rate regime a series of additional questions should be answered before the proper 
identification of the regime is finalized. These are: which currency to choose when pegging 
the new currency to another currency; how to find the appropriate level; and, if a fixed rate 
is preferred, how adjustable should the peg be? The importance of the last question is 
supported by the fact that the success of a fixed exchange rate regime depends on its 
flexibility in response to changing external and internal situations, shifts in macro-economic 
policies, and the variable ability of governments to control money growth. The performance 
of a fixed exchange rate regime depends very much on how adjustable it is and on the initial 
level chosen. Although these qualifications were generally accepted by seminar participants, 
they still adhered to the distinction between fixed versus flexible exchange rates. 
The following arguments were stated in favor of a floating exchange rate regime. Given the 
inheritance of central planning with highly distorted prices as well as autarky, it would be 
extremely complicated to set the initial level of the exchange rate. With a floating exchange 
rate, this task can be simplified since the first period of floating allows the market to 
determine an acceptable level. In addition, large terms of trade shocks, which many countries 
of the FSU region expect to encounter, are more readily absorbed with a floating exchange 
rate than with a fixed exchange rate system. 
The disadvantage of the floating rate system is that the government loses an appropriate guide 
for monetary management (credit expansion could be carried out in a quasi automatic way) 
and has to choose another nominal anchor. While to choose a monetary aggregate for this 
purpose is not difficult, the problem inevitably emerges, as it is well-known for industrialized 
countries, that the demand for these aggregates is likely to be unstable. 
The arguments in favor of a fixed exchange rate regime were as follows. With such a 
regime, the inexperienced and overburdened monetary authorities of these newly independent 
FSU republics can be freed from the complex task of carrying out independent monetary 
policies. An obvious nominal anchor is imported from the rest of the world, as are a set of 
relative prices, at least for the traded goods sector. The fixed exchange rate helps to 
implement stabilization in countries where hyperinflation is an imminent threat, and with the 
psychological impact of the fixed rate inflationary expectations can also be eased. This system 
also helps reduce exchange risks implied by the variability of exchange rates for the 
enterprises engaged in foreign trade. 
The primary disadvantage of the fixed rate system is the dependency on foreign monetary 
policies that may be subject to changes inappropriate for the country which has pegged its 
currency. If the currency is pegged to the US dollar or the German mark, the central bank 
of the given country has to be prepared to follow the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve 
Board or the Bundesbank, respectively. As for fiscal policies the basic requirement is that the 
budget deficit should be financed by available foreign borrowing (the use of internal 
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borrowing, like the issuance of government securities is advised not earlier than a year from 
the introduction of the new currency). 
Due to conditions unique to the successor republics of the Soviet Union, expert opinions 
regarding the choice of either a floating or a fixed exchange rate regime have diverged to the 
one or other extreme. However, recent examples of Estonia and Latvia did not provide a 
conclusive evidence for either. The two countries chose different regimes in an essentially 
similar environment, each successful in its own right. 
Estonia opted for a fixed exchange rate regime, and for the most stringent version within that 
group of regimes -- the Currency Board system. The kroon was tied to the German mark at 
an exchange rate of 8 to 1. Hard currency reserves provided the legal guarantee for the new 
currency that was made fully convertible within the territory of Estonia. Since the 
introduction of the kroon, gold and hard currency deposits at the Bank of Estonia more than 
doubled. Latvia, on the other hand, embarked on a floating rate regime with the Latvian 
ruble in July 1992. So far, both countries succeeded in curbing inflation substantially, and 
sustaining their original regime. Both countries successfully maintained a balanced fiscal 
position, with practically no domestic financing requirement. 
Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes for FSU Republics 
The successor republics of the Soviet Union are not uniform and the suggested exchange rate 
systems differ accordingly. For instance, the Currency Board system adopted by the Estonian 
government implies, in essence, a concession of much of the economic independence the 
country had just acquired after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Many experts think that 
republics of larger size and importance (like Russia and the Ukraine) would be reluctant to 
accept such a disrepute, and that for purely political reasons. For larger countries, the 
currency reserves needed to intervene against fluctuations would require large resources that 
presently do not seem to be available. 
Some policy analysts felt a system of fixed rates across most of the successor republics would 
imply that those countries that record the highest inflation rates would determine the monetary 
policy in all other republics. There would also be a danger that the tools to ensure exchange 
rate coordination would be less of the financial and credit type; rather, they would be more 
administrative including price controls, centralization of payments, and forced bilateral as 
well as other clearing arrangements. In turn, this would lead to endless political arguments 
about credit levels and the handling of debts. These consequences, which resemble present 
practices, would cause instability in these economies and further decline in inter-republican 
trade, compounding the decline already caused by demand shocks. 
Thus, a system of flexible exchange rates across the republics would be much more desirable. 
This would allow varied adjustments to internal shocks that vary among republics, help make 
the various currencies convertible, create a progress that would enhance inter-republic 
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payments, and consequently trade among republics. This solution is also more compatible 
with liberalization and decentralization of foreign trade. 
Still, some seminar participants did not find this argument convincing. There is evidence that 
suggests there is and will be a continuing high degree of dependence of the small republics 
on Russia with respect to trade relations. As a result, the floating rate for the smaller 
republics is bound to lead to large fluctuation. A common international experience is that 
exchange rates tend to fluctuate in a more volatile way than prices. In the presence of a 
floating rate system, this phenomenon would have far-reaching adverse consequences for the 
smaller republics and their chances for stabilization. A fixed rate, on the other hand, could 
provide a certain element of stability. It is true, however, that even fixed rates themselves 
would not be sufficient to stabilize these economies; complementary policies would be 
needed. A qualification to the proposition of the fixed exchange rate applies here: a fixed 
rate is rarely truly fixed and its success highly depends on the initial level and its ability to 
adjust. 
While to peg the exchange rates of the smaller economies to the Russian ruble now seems to 
be a dangerous undertaking, one participant at the seminar argued that it would be reasonable 
to expect some republics (like the Asian republics, Belarus and Moldova) to peg their new 
currencies to the ruble if Russia can achieve sensible macroeconomic discipline. Other 
republics, like the Baltics, would probably consider this option as politically unacceptable. 
Exchange Rate Regime for Russia and Effectiveness of Exchange Rates 
It is clear that much of Russia's unfavorable experience with the fixed exchange rate regime 
has been related to the unsettled conditions of the ruble area, such as the inability of the 
Central Bank of Russia to carry out its monetary policy in an environment where other 
republican central banks were able to extend credits in the form of republican non-cash 
rubles. Experts at the seminar, however, pointed out that the republican central banks were 
responsible for no more than 20 percent of credit creation in Russia in 1992, and the Russian 
economy itself seemed to have vested interests to credit neighboring republics to enable them 
to maintain trade with Russian enterprises. 
Since 1 July 1992, the exchange rate of the cash ruble has been uniform and, in principle, 
freely floating. The daily level is determined by the CBR based on the results of exchange 
bids on the Moscow inter-bank currency market. This market is still extremely thin and the 
evolving exchange rates do not tend to give a realistic valuation of the ruble. 
While most republics of the former Soviet Union are in the process of transition to a market 
economy, close observers of enterprise behavior warn that many underlying conditions of the 
expected impact of different exchange rate regimes are not yet present in the republics. It 
is highly probable that enterprises would not respond to fluctuations in bilateral exchange 
rates and thus exchange rates should not be considered as effective exchange rates. The 
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explanation for this lies in the still large absolute and relative size of the enterprises in their 
market and their ability to disregard changes caused by exchange rate fluctuations. 
Another explanation for the same phenomenon is related to the close to hyperinflationary 
conditions and long delays in payments for supplies. Because of high inflation, it is very 
profitable for buyers to delay their payments. Under conditions of 30 percent monthly 
inflation, it is absolutely crucial for enterprise revenues whether payments are received within 
two weeks or only in three months. As compared to this kind of variation of payments, 
exchange rate fluctuations are negligible and would not, in fact, influence enterprise behavior. 
A final matter of concern at the seminar was the relationship of capital flows and exchange 
rate determination. As the evolution of exchange rates is usually analyzed in the light of 
current account transactions, one participant warned that the issue of capital flows is a "wild 
card" in exchange rate determination. Very little attention has been paid to capital account 
transactions by policy-makers. Moreover, there are no current statistics available on capital 
movements among the republics. What is clear though, is that for most of the republics very 
few restrictions on capital movements are enforced. Accordingly, governments establishing 
exchange rate regimes should be aware of the high potential for capital flight and speculative 
capital movements. 
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